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In the aftermath of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings in
Seattle in November 1999, serious questions were
asked about the long-term political will of the
United States to lead the global economy toward
more open markets. CED Trustees felt the need 
to reaffirm their support for open trade more 
generally, and for the more immediate issue of
extending permanent normal trade relations
(PNTR) to China. 
This program statement, The Case for
Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China, draws
on CED’s long history of work in international
trade, finance, and investment. For over 
60 years, CED Trustees have believed that an open
global economy leads to freer markets, reduced
conflict, and higher living standards worldwide. 
We believe engaging China will provide enormous
political, economic, and national security benefits
for the United States and will bring about much
needed social and economic change in China.
Admitting China to the WTO and normaliz-
ing our trade relations with China are just the
beginning. The protests in Seattle indicate broad-
er disagreements on the process of economic 
globalization. CED Trustees have voted to under-
take a fuller study of trade and the WTO in an
upcoming policy statement.
THE CASE FOR
PERMANENT
NORMAL TRADE
RELATIONS 
WITH CHINA
In previous policy statements and other publications, the Committee for Economic
Development has supported the admission of
China into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and extending to China permanent
normal trade relations (PNTR) status.1 This
statement reaffirms our support for engage-
ment with China by permanently normalizing
trade relations. 
We urge Congress to approve PNTR status
for China. We believe that China’s entry
into the WTO, and permanent normal
trade relations with China, would have sub-
stantial long-term political, economic, and
national security benefits for the United
States. We also fear that rejection of PNTR
status would harm U.S. consumers, work-
ers, and businesses that benefit from trade
with China.
The specific issue on which Congress will
vote is whether to grant PNTR status to China.
The Congress will not vote on China’s accession
to the WTO. Under existing authority, the
President has already made the decision to sup-
port China’s membership. Since other WTO
members are likely to agree to China’s entry,
the operative question for the United States is
whether we will gain access to China’s markets
on a reciprocal basis by granting them access to
ours. The current practice of granting tempo-
rary NTR status on an annual basis is no longer
an option.2
America’s Economic
Interests
The Longer Term: PNTR Promises
Substantial Benefits 
The most important effect of admitting
China to the WTO will be to foster long-
term economic, political, and social change 
in China, which will significantly benefit the
United States. China is already one of the
largest economies in the world, with a GDP of
over $1 trillion.3 Since 1980, China’s per capita
GDP has grown at an average annual rate of
over 8 percent, and its trade has quadrupled.4
Net foreign direct investment (FDI) in China
rose from less than $5 billion in 1990 to $45 
billion in 1998. 
China’s growth during the last two
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decades has been based on economic reforms
that have shifted much production from state-
run enterprises to private industry. The Chinese
leadership understands that China now must
accelerate this transition to a private enterprise
economy based on market competition. Entry
into the WTO is a strategy for doing so. The
leadership expects WTO membership to help
lock in previous economic reforms and create
further impetus for economic growth.  As one
expert has observed: 
“For China, WTO membership is not a tacti-
cal step to outsmart its trading partners.
Rather, the WTO is part of a broader strategy
to lock in a tenuous transition from commu-
nism to a market economy.” 5
China’s full integration into the global
trading system will produce enormous econom-
ic benefits for both China and the rest of the
world. Over the next twenty years, China will
continue to grow as an economic power and
will become one of the world’s largest trading
nations. China is expected to account for a full
40 percent of the growth of developing country
imports between 1992 and 2020, and its share
in world trade is projected to triple, from 3 to
10 percent.6 An open and prosperous Chinese
economy will provide major export and invest-
ment opportunities for U.S. firms. Chinese
imports of capital- and knowledge-intensive
goods, agricultural products, and services are
expected to grow especially rapidly. (For exam-
ple, China is projected to account for over one-
third of the growth of U.S. farm exports over
the next decade.) The United States, uniquely
a major exporter of all these categories of
trade, will be especially well positioned to bene-
fit from China’s growth.
Exports to China will raise the incomes of
U.S. producers and workers, since jobs support-
ed by exports pay about 15 percent more than
average. In some cases, the additional exports
will lower production costs through economies
of scale, making U.S. firms more competitive
globally. At the same time, imports from China
will give consumers more choice at lower prices
and benefit U.S. businesses that use Chinese
components. In those sectors where imports
compete with domestic goods, imports also
stimulate productivity. 
As WTO membership strengthens the
rule of law in China, it will erode the arbitrary
use of power by individual leaders.  As it
strengthens competition, it will weaken state
monopolies and spur entrepreneurship.
Finally, WTO membership will increase foreign
participation in the Chinese economy, exposing
more of the Chinese people to ideas and infor-
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mation from outside. Such changes will encour-
age private initiatives of various kinds, includ-
ing the development of independent civil orga-
nizations such as private trade unions. WTO
membership will also increase China’s interac-
tion with other nations through its participa-
tion in international rule making and negotia-
tions, thereby reducing its isolation.  
The Near Term: PNTR Provides Modest
Benefits, But Its Rejection Could Be Costly
The near-term effects on the entire U.S.
economy of China’s accession to the WTO will
be modest, since China currently has a very
small role in our economy; our trade with
China (exports plus imports) is only about 1
percent of U.S. GDP. In addition, since the
United States is already a WTO member, no
changes in our trade policies will be required as
a result of China’s accession.7 The far-reaching
policy changes required of China for WTO
membership, however, would significantly
improve access to the Chinese market for a
number of U.S. firms and their workers. (See
box next page: Highlights of the U.S-China
Bilateral Agreement on China’s Accession to
the WTO.)
Analyses of the effects on the U.S. econo-
my of China’s accession to the WTO by the U.S.
International Trade Commission (USITC) and
others indicate (perhaps conservatively) that
U.S. exports to China would increase by about
10-20 percent, or $2–4 billion in the short-
term.9 While such export gains would be impor-
tant to individual firms that expand sales, they
would be small compared with total U.S.
exports in 1999 of $958 billion. Similarly,
imports from China are estimated to rise by
about $3–4 billion, and these imports would
principally displace those from other
countries.10 Total production in the United
States would change little, but specific sectors
and industries, such as agriculture, aircraft, and
machinery and equipment, would gain from
additional exports to China. The effects on
wages of both skilled and unskilled workers
would be negligible. The summary conclusion
of the USITC report was that the short-term
effects would be “positive, but minor.”11
Outright rejection of PNTR status for
China, on the other hand, could lead to an
abnormal, retaliatory trade relationship that
could damage American workers, farmers, and
businesses. China would then have the right
under WTO rules to discriminate against
imports from the United States. U.S. exports
would continue to face high tariffs and other
trade barriers and our service providers would
be denied access to the Chinese marketplace,
while firms of other WTO members would gain
greater access to Chinese markets. The result of
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Highlights of the U.S-China Bilateral Agreement on China’s Accession to the WTO
The United States and China concluded a bilateral agreement in November 1999 to establish the con-
ditions for China’s entry into the WTO. Under the terms of the agreement, China would significantly
reduce tariffs on imports of agricultural and industrial products. Tariffs on industrial products would
decline from a simple average of 24.6 percent (in 1997) to 9.4 percent. All tariffs on such information
technology products as semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, computers, and computer
equipment would be eliminated by 2005. Tariffs on automobiles would decline from 80-100 percent
today to 25 percent in 2006. China would establish large and increasing tariff-rate quotas on bulk agri-
cultural commodities, which would significantly open the way for increased exports from the United
States.8
In agriculture, China has agreed to cut average tariffs on priority U.S. products such as beef, cit-
rus, and dairy from 31 percent to 14 percent by 2004, expand access for commodities like wheat, corn,
cotton, and soybeans, and eliminate agricultural export subsidies.
With respect to non-tariff barriers, China would eliminate all quotas and quantitative restrictions
on industrial goods. China would also limit some state trading activities and eliminate export subsidies.
The agreement requires China to phase in full trading and distribution rights for most of its industrial
sectors.
The agreement also opens China’s markets in a wide range of services, including banking, insur-
ance, telecommunications, distribution, professional activities, and other business services. For exam-
ple, China has committed to full market access in five years for U.S. banks, including internal branch-
ing and national treatment for all newly permitted activities. In securities underwriting and trading,
China has agreed to permit minority foreign-owned joint ventures to engage in fund management on
the same terms as Chinese firms. Liberalization of regulations that apply to wholesaling, retailing, and
other distribution services will allow foreign firms to transport and sell goods—including imports—in
China. China will join the WTO’s Basic Telecommunications Agreement and end geographic restric-
tions on wireless services and its ban on foreign direct investment in telecommunitcations.
The agreement ends Chinese investment policies (local content requirements, forced technology
transfer, export mandates, foreign-exchange balancing requirements) aimed at drawing jobs and tech-
nology to China.
On the U.S side, the agreement contains a special safeguard rule to protect against surges in
China’s exports to the United States, and it specifies a non-market economy methodology to address
dumping.
SOURCES: Economic Report of the President, 2000; USTR Press Release, “U.S., China Sign Historic Trade Agreement,” November 15, 1999; and
Testimony of Charlene Barshefsky before the House Committee on Ways and Means, February 16, 2000.
such discrimination could be severe. Workers,
farmers, and firms that now depend on trade
with China would lose jobs and incomes as
China shifted its purchases to other countries.
At the same time, our tariffs on imports from
China could revert to non-NTR levels, raising
their prices and hurting consumers. In some
cases, tariff rates would be high enough to
choke off imports. This would have harsh con-
sequences for businesses or consumers that are
dependent on them, who would have to search
for alternative suppliers.
Adjusting to Change
The changes in production and work that
accompany expanded trade inevitably entail
some dislocation. Such dislocation, however, is
not qualitatively different from — and quantita-
tively much smaller than — that arising from
new technology, changes in consumer prefer-
ences, or other sources. Structural change is an
inevitable feature of a dynamic market econo-
my. Although gains elsewhere in the economy
will exceed the costs of those dislocations, some
workers, businesses, and communities will feel
the effects. U.S. firms that rely heavily on
unskilled workers will be less able to compete
with Chinese firms for sales in the United States
and third-country markets. They will also find it
harder to compete for human and physical
resources with other domestic firms in rapidly
growing sectors, such as communications and
information technology.
These adjustment pressures should not be
overestimated, however. A World Bank study
finds that most of the recent drop in U.S. man-
ufacturing jobs occurred before Chinese
exports penetrated the U.S. market. Imports
from China effectively displaced labor-intensive
imports from other Asian exporters that had
earlier penetrated markets in textiles, clothing,
footwear, and electronics.12 This displacement
of other suppliers will continue to be the major
effect as trade with China expands.
CED has long argued that the costs of
adjustment to economic change should not be
borne entirely by affected individuals and busi-
nesses, but should be shared by society. While
we believe that impeding change to protect
these affected firms and workers would be both
futile and damaging to our long-term growth
and living standards, we also believe that firms
and governments should take actions to ease
the impact of dislocation on individual workers
and communities. Firms can provide a mix of
advance notice, severance pay, outplacement
services, job retraining, in-placement training,
and extended health coverage, as appropriate.13
Public policy, while fostering employment
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opportunities in a strong and stable macroeco-
nomic environment, can ease adjustments to
job dislocation with social insurance, training,
and re-employment programs. The conclusion
of our 1996 policy statement, American Workers
and Economic Change is particularly relevant:
“New technologies, new competitive forces,
and new ways of organizing economic activity
are changing the nature and structure of work
in America. Like the earlier restructuring from
agriculture to industry, these changes enhance
our economic prospects but also outpace insti-
tutional change. Some Americans are being left
behind, and others are feeling anxious, inse-
cure, and burdened. Protectionist and isola-
tionist policies, which some call for, would be
counterproductive because they inhibit growth
and economic opportunity, which are the paths
to higher standards of living.
There are no quick and easy remedies for
these problems. Individuals must take more
responsibility for their own career develop-
ment. Businesses must embrace the new com-
petitive environment by implementing new
technologies and helping workers to become
more skilled and autonomous in using them.
As for public policy, stronger economic growth
and expanded economic opportunity should be
our litmus tests. But even in the best of circum-
stances, imaginative political leadership will
be required to make the benefits of economic
change available to all Americans.”14 
U.S. International
Economic Leadership
The vote on PNTR status for China will
be a test of our commitment to an open trad-
ing system. Maintenance of that commitment is
essential if we are to preserve that system and
encourage other countries, especially smaller
economies, to stay within it. Over the last half-
century, the United States has been the driving
force behind successive rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations; without U.S. leadership the
system could atrophy. The United States must
continue to lead the open trading system by its
actions.  Granting China PNTR status would reaf-
firm that U.S. leadership.
There can be no doubt that the prosperi-
ty of the United States and, indeed, the entire
global economy has been enhanced by the
growth in international trade supported by a
widening international regime of liberal trade
policies. The WTO (formerly the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT) is
the cornerstone of that regime. Through the
GATT/WTO, trade barriers have been
reduced, the rule of law has been strengthened
internationally, and the economic growth and
development of the world’s less developed
nations have been fostered.15
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The United States derives direct econom-
ic benefits from the WTO framework for
expanding trade. Our capacity to import and
export is directly tied to the reductions in tar-
iffs and other trade barriers that have been
achieved through negotiations under the aus-
pices of the GATT and WTO. Through eight
rounds of tariff negotiations, the average tariff
on industrial products in developed countries
has fallen from about 40 percent to less than 
4 percent.16
The WTO also promotes an orderly
means for settling disputes between sovereign
nations. Open trade requires a certain amount
of confidence that competition will be fair, and
that confidence is engendered by enforceable
rules of conduct. Membership in the WTO
binds countries to agree to such rules. For
example, countries agree not to discriminate
against others; once a tariff is lowered, it can-
not be raised again; countries may not raise
new barriers to trade to offset the reduction in
an old one; subsidies and regulatory benefits
may not be provided to an industry or firm to
give a competitive advantage in trade; and intel-
lectual property rights must be protected. 
However, WTO rules do not require coun-
tries to give up their sovereign rights to make
their own laws or determine their own stan-
dards of conduct within their borders, as is
sometimes alleged. Environment, health, and
safety standards have become “trade issues”
when countries have either tried to compel
other countries to adhere to their standards or
applied regulations in a manner that discrimi-
nates against imports. As long as laws are trans-
parent and non-discriminatory, countries may
regulate their domestic economies as they wish
and may even temporarily curtail import surges
and take other actions to protect domestic pro-
ducers.17
Concerns have been raised about the
implementation and enforcement of the liber-
alization of Chinese trade and investment poli-
cies required for WTO membership.  However,
it seems clear that U.S. trade with China under
the auspices of a multilateral body such as the
WTO can be more easily monitored, with fewer
political obstacles, than trade on a bilateral
basis, especially if normal non-discriminatory
relations are absent. The U.S. goal of an open
Chinese market is more likely to be achieved
through WTO discipline than by unilateral
actions.
The WTO also supports another major
goal of U.S. policy — the economic advance-
ment of low-income countries. The United
States supports global growth both for its own
sake and because it contributes to U.S. domes-
tic growth. As developing countries grow eco-
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nomically, they become better customers for
U.S. exports and more reliable suppliers of
components and finished goods for U.S. facto-
ries, retailers, and consumers. The value of the
WTO is clear to the developing countries them-
selves; over 100 of them have chosen to become
members and another 32 countries, including
China, seek membership. Developing countries
have learned through experience that econom-
ic growth comes through “trade not aid.” 
The importance of an open trade system
to the economic prospects of developing coun-
tries is shown dramatically in the figure oppo-
site. Countries that are strongly outward-orient-
ed have had significantly higher rates of growth
in the past quarter-century, while the most
inward oriented countries have suffered real
income losses.18
A refusal to normalize our trade relation-
ship with China following the demonstrations
at the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle
could be interpreted abroad as a rejection of
the global trading system by the United States.
The continuing need for U.S. economic leader-
ship in the global economy was noted in our
1997 policy statement U.S. Economic Policy
Toward the Asia-Pacific Region. Our recommenda-
tion there was made in the specific context of
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
(APEC), but it applies more broadly to our 
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position in relation to the WTO and the global
economy:
“Realistically, there is no alternative to U.S.
leadership in an organization dedicated to the
goal of free and open trade and investment. No
other large APEC country has demonstrated a
strong commitment to these principles and a
willingness and capacity to step out front and
take the lead.
However, the U.S. role as leader must be
different from what it was after World War II,
when the U.S. economy virtually dominated the
world. At that time, the three pillars of the pre-
➫8
sent global economic system (the GATT, IMF,
and World Bank) were conceived and estab-
lished at U.S. initiative. With the present wider
diffusion of wealth and economic power and
heightened national sensibilities, particularly
in the developing world, America’s new role
both globally and in APEC must be that of ral-
lier of nations: The United States must project
a coherent strategy to advance the common
interest, and inspire and induce collective
action by its own example and by patient con-
sultation with its principal trading partners in
both the industrial and developing worlds.” 19
Promoting Peace,
Security, and Other
Non-Economic Goals 
The economic gains described above will
make possible significant gains in other areas,
most notably in fostering political and social
change in China, enhancing our peace and
security, and promoting our goals in the areas
of labor rights and environmental protection. 
Political and Social Change in China, 
Peace, and Security
As China opens further to world trade
and investment, its polity and society gradually
are likely to change in ways that benefit the
United States. This will not happen overnight.
Indeed, the recognition by the Chinese authori-
ties of the enormous potential of economic lib-
eralization to transform their social and politi-
cal structures will produce repressive responses
that temporarily set back such progress. But
ultimately it will prove impossible to maintain a
closed and regulated society in an open econo-
my that is dependent on the free flows of infor-
mation that increasingly drive productive enter-
prises.
Changes in the Chinese economic system
will strengthen the private sector, weaken the
state sector, and improve prospects for political
reform. To abide by WTO principles, China will
have to strengthen the rule of law and the
transparency of its rules and decision-making.
International trade and investment will bring
not only goods and money, but also exposure
to new ideas and new ways of doing things.
Access to information about China will
increase, as will access to outside information
within China. Attempts by China to crack down
on dissent or control communication through
the Internet will become less effective and ulti-
mately prove futile. As noted by Human Rights
Watch, the leading organization tracking
human rights around the world:
“As a WTO member, China will bind itself to
global norms of trade. It is a step towards
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China’s integration into the international sys-
tem regulating not only trade relations but also
governments’ treatment of their own citizens….
Greater transparency in economic matters will
likely increase demands and expectations for
more openness in other areas.” 20
Countries that have strongly embraced the
global economy typically have seen their living
standards increase and political tensions dimin-
ish; those that have rejected open markets and
freer trade completely — North Korea, the for-
mer Soviet Union, and Mao’s China — have
paid a high price.21 We also know from history
that failure to engage a rising superpower in the
global leadership structure can have dire conse-
quences. The failure of the leading economic
powers in the late nineteenth century to inte-
grate Germany and Japan into the global econo-
my, and a similar failure of the international
community to assimilate the rising economic
power of those countries after World War I, had
calamitous results.22 While bringing China fully
into the trading system will not guarantee peace
and security, excluding it would invite a repeti-
tion of the errors of the past.
Labor and Environmental Standards
The WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle
in November 1999 drew worldwide attention to
several perceived shortcomings of the global
trading system. Protestors claimed that trade
encourages environmental degradation and
lowers labor standards in both developed and
developing countries. This perception, howev-
er, is at odds with the facts and the historical
record. In fact, trade liberalization, by boosting
economic growth and promoting more effi-
cient use of resources, creates the conditions
for environmental and social improvement. A
country that is open to trade and investment
and accepts the norms of globalization is
pushed to restructure and modernize its econo-
my, pursue political reforms, root out corrup-
tion, and conform to international standards in
labor, environmental, and other practices. 
Environmental Standards. The enemy of the
environment is not freer trade; it is poverty.23 As
economies grow and open, they have more
resources to prevent or remediate pollution.24
The facts show that good environmental perfor-
mance and rising per capita income go togeth-
er.25 The wealthiest countries rank highest on
an “Environment Sustainability Index” (ESI),
which measures factors such as a country’s envi-
ronmental systems and how well it cooperates
with others in managing common environmen-
tal problems.26 While China already ranks above
such countries as South Africa, Turkey, and
Mexico on the ESI, its performance should
improve as it grows economically. 
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Trade restrictions, on the other hand, can
harm the environment. For example, trade
restrictions in OECD countries on labor-inten-
sive manufacturing may add to environmental
pressures in developing countries by restricting
them to exports of natural resource based com-
modities. Agricultural protectionism in Europe,
the United States, and Japan leads to more
intensive farming in these regions than is eco-
nomically or environmentally justified.27
Inward-looking economic development, predi-
cated on trade restrictions, has produced seri-
ous environmental problems, including those
in China.28 In the words of one informed
observer:
“Contrary to what many see as conventional
wisdom, protectionism has exacerbated envi-
ronmental problems throughout the world.
Pollution intensity has grown faster in coun-
tries that have remained relatively closed to
world markets. Perhaps the most dramatic
example of the effects of closed borders is the
former Soviet bloc. After 40 years these closed
economies ended up with many environmental
disasters that resulted from subsidized energy,
inefficiencies and the lack of access to newer
and cleaner technology. Open markets have
consistently improved the environmental
record.29
Labor Standards. The most effective means
of improving labor standards is to raise them
through economic growth. As economies grow,
real wages rise. In Taiwan, for example, real
wages are eight times higher than they were a
generation ago; in Korea, they have risen more
than six fold.30 Throughout East Asia working
conditions—measured in terms of unemploy-
ment, the composition of employment, real
earnings, and absolute poverty-have improved
markedly over a period of several decades.31
Nearly everywhere, child labor has declined
sharply as national income has risen.32 With
respect to China, entry into the WTO is much
more likely to raise labor standards than to
depress them. The World Bank projects that
the most rapid real wage increases in the world
during 1992-2020 will occur in China.33 As the
Chinese economy becomes more market ori-
ented and workers gain political freedoms they
now lack, such as the right of assembly, labor
conditions will improve as well.
Concerns about labor standards arise
from a number of sources. Many observers
express both economic and humanitarian con-
cerns about the conditions of work and com-
pensation in developing countries. Others are
concerned that lower pay and less desirable
working conditions in developing countries will
support low-cost competition with U.S produc-
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ers and consequently reduce wages and labor
standards in the United States.
While some concerns about the welfare of
workers in developing countries are legitimate,
low labor standards elsewhere have little direct
impact on the vast majority of U.S. workers.34
The low cost of labor in developing countries
generally reflects low productivity. Productivity
and cost differences between low-skilled work-
ers in the United States and most developing
countries are so large that any realistic set of
higher standards for workers in developing
countries is unlikely to affect trade signifi-
cantly.35 Furthermore, even if workers in a
developing country were paid less than warrant-
ed by their productivity, their low-cost exports
would tend to displace similar goods from
other developing countries in the U.S. market
rather than U.S. production.
The United States has long recognized
the need to promote the rights of workers in
developing countries. U.S. policy on worker
rights has operated on three tracks, unilateral,
multilateral, and private.36 The core unilateral
programs are the Generalized System of
Preferences and the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation, which tie access to U.S. 
markets, trade preferences, investment pro-
grams, and foreign aid to a country’s obser-
vance of worker rights. The United States also
works through multilateral groups, such as 
the International Labor Organization, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, and the World Bank, to protect
and promote worker rights. In addition, the
federal government and private organizations
have encouraged private-sector action to curtail
exploitative forms of child labor and to pro-
mote worker rights through product labeling
and voluntary codes of conduct.
Conclusion
The United States should grant China
permanent normal trade relations status to fos-
ter long-term economic, political, and social
change in China, which will benefit the United
States economically and politically. Adherence
to international trade rules will strengthen the
Chinese private sector and weaken government
control. Expanded trade will also increase
China’s engagement with other countries and
encourage it to become a more constructive
member of the international community. Those
political changes will, in turn, support econom-
ic progress in China and greater trade and
investment between China and the United
States. Economic and political change in China
will reinforce each other. Rejection of PNTR
status for China will not only deny us these ben-
efits, but will have damaging effects on many
U.S. workers and businesses
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